speech of Tobias Pflüger on a seminar in Cyprus, 16. September 2006

The new euro-Atlantic military interventionism and the EU- NATO cooperation

I would like to talk to you about some recent trends and tendencies of EU-Militarization

First we have to realize that the European Security Strategy of December 2003, the birth child of Mr Solana outlining the future direction of European foreign policy, the vision of Europe’s role in the world, is based on a vague concept of threats, aimed at deriving military authorisation for interventions around the globe. Geared towards preventive military strikes and close NATO-EU cooperation, international law is very often put to one side. I deplore the continued militarization of EU foreign policy. I therefore stress the need to return to a civilian Europe, and consider that the continuing militarization of the European Union also risks posing an increasing threat to EU citizens.

The European Security Strategy uses a plethora of vague threats aimed at providing the European Union with the capacity to wage war worldwide. I'm very much concerned by the dimensions this has been taking recently, in particular move towards depicting the increasing competition for sources of energy as a situation justifying military intervention. This shows how far we have gone.

To be clear what Europe actually does under its Security and Defence policy has nothing to do with defence but with the preparation of military interventions. The European Security Strategy does not include any concept of territorial defence; in fact it moves in the opposite direction and becomes more and more a threat to world peace and security. For example

(a) The conversion of the concept of defence into attack, preventive strikes and military intervention;

(b) the military integration of the European Union's neighbours, especially Turkey, into the European Security Strategy and the European Arms Agency, known as the European Defence Agency;

(c) The conduct of military operations under the misleading banner of humanitarian assistance as in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

I would also like to draw your attention to the cooperation between the European Union and NATO, the closely interwoven military structures of the two organisations under the Berlin Plus Agreement, which jeopardises the neutrality of Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland, as well as the non-aligned status of Cyprus and Malta. Imagine that on the basis of this agreement the European Union is disbursing unknown amounts of money to NATO as payment for the use of NATO structures, as exemplified by the ALTHEA operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have asked the Council many times about the amount of money which is transferred from the EU to NATO but the British and Austrian Presidencies have refused to provide information on this.

Another dangerous aspect of EU militarization is the deliberate mixing of civil and military missions into one: a so called civil-military mission. This not only puts the staff of aid organisations at great risk but has been a stealthy way of justifying the creation of a military European Headquarters - the so called Civ-Mil Cell.

There are alternatives. The EU could gradually scale down the forces established for military intervention. The massive arms budget needed to finance the creation of EU intervention forces and then sustain them, should be used for peaceful purposes. People must realize that the build-up of military capabilities constitutes a potential global threat which is encouraging global rearming, on the one hand for military intervention and on the other for defence against such intervention;

Imagine in the European Security Strategy itself you will find concepts close to the US strategy of preventive war. I believe it cannot be the task of security policy to seek the 'first line of defence' abroad, as embodied in the European Security Strategy. If the concept of European security means more EU intervention this would constitute a growing potential threat to the public. European leaders must seek a mandate from the United Nations in the event of preventive wars. But unfortunately this would be nothing more than an attempt to legitimise such a serious and manifest breach of international law.

The development of the European Union armed forces is proceeding 'at the speed of light' (Javier Solana); The aim of achieving compatibility of equipment with NATO forces and, in particular, with the NATO Rapid Response Force embodies additional potential for rearmament and militarization;

I think an additional military budget on the European level can not be justified. Further more it is against the EU-Treaty, but unfortunately this is exactly what is happening now. More and more budget lines in the European Community budget are being militarized. I deplore this. Even under the title of crisis management an increasing number of military missions are being financed. The current system of hidden military budgets is beyond any effective parliamentary control and has to end. What is even worse is the fact that some EU military measures are being financed from the European Development Fund, as the Support mission in Sudan the AMIS II-Mission.

I see the use of the ATHENA mechanism and other ad hoc mechanisms to finance EU military interventions as signalling the intention of the European Union and of its Member States to disguise the real scale of expenditure on military intervention. We must call for an end to the reclassification of military missions as police or civilian missions, which is done to ensure funding from the Community budget.

Next is the problem of the emerging military-industrial complex which is also sponsored by the Cypriot taxpayer even when, as I have been informed Cyprus hasn't got an armament or so called security industry. I think that the attempts to create a so-called common defence equipment market are intended primarily to develop a military-industrial complex in the European Union and to increase the profits of major arms groups in the European Union, such as EADS, BAE Systems and Thales. We experience it in Brussels every day. This emerging military-industrial complex cannot be controlled democratically.

So in this respect, the 'establishment of a code of conduct on defence procurement' by the European Arms Agency, is a first step towards securing sufficient State arms orders for a future military-industrial complex and stepping up arms cooperation with US arms corporations. I'm concerned about the circumvention of Article 296 of the Treaty on European Union, insist on an immediate end to these rearmament endeavours, which may also lead to further enhancement of the European Union's leading position worldwide with regard to arms exports;

The EU is in a swiftly-moving process of militarization, leading to autonomously deployable capabilities enabling it to wage war worldwide. For this aim military capabilities are currently being built up, such as:

(a) the setting up of 60 000-strong EU intervention forces, to be backed up by the availability of up to 200 000 more soldiers, which are to be used for the full range of so-called Petersberg missions, including combat operations;

(b) The setting up of 18 EU battle groups, deployable at short notice, each consisting of 1500 – 2000 soldiers;

(c) The setting up of EU paramilitary units, which are proposed primarily to combat rebellions, such as the European Gendarmerie Force;

(d) The setting up of the EU's own civilian-military structures to take over the occupation of a country following a military intervention;

(e) The development of autonomous European command structures, consisting of a Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Military Staff and a so-called Civilian and Military Cell and an Operations Centre, following the NATO model;

(f) the development of a European Arms Agency, known as the Defence Agency, which has already obtained a huge increase in the funding available for security and arms research in the European Union;

(g) The creation of a common arms market, which primarily serves the profits of large arms groups such as EADS, BAE Systems and Thales;

(h) The introduction of a separate title for security and space research under the 7th Framework Research Programme; where the European taxpayers will spent more than 1, 6 Billion Euro in the next seven years for armament research alone.

The militarization of the European Union will accelerate if a so-called Defence and Security Union is created, in which the following elements are further developed:

(a) Further encouragement for the development of space-supported military
Capabilities;

(b) The completion of a common arms market;

(c) The creation of the European Union's own military budget, which would signify a further increase in arms and military expenditure throughout Europe;

(d) the lumping together of potential powers through the creation of an EU foreign minister who would be simultaneously responsible for such diverse policies as development policy, foreign policy and security policy; this would be synonymous with an end to the horizontal division of powers with regard to foreign and security policy;

(e) A clause on common preventive military so-called action to combat
Terrorism;

(f) a further undermining of parliamentary scrutiny by further decision-making powers being handed over to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which constitutes the real centre of power and decision-making centre for the European Security and Defence Policy.

As I already mentioned:

The Council agreed to an interventionist concept including the build up for military capacities for this purpose:

The Battle Group

The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis is an essential aspect of the European Security and Defence Policy and a key element of the EU's military capabilities development and of the 2010 Headline Goal. This ability is developed in full complementarily and mutual reinforcement with NATO and NATO initiatives such as the NATO response force.

At the 22 November 2004 Military Capability Commitment Conference, Member States made initial commitment to the formation of 13 EU Battle groups. The ability to undertake one Battle group-sized rapid response operation is already in place.

Full operational capability of the first battle groups is scheduled to be reached in 2007. The Union should have the capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battle group-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously. Modalities for the force generation (certification, training and rotation of forces) have been developed.

Now there is a concept of 18 battle Groups one including Greece, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus which will be ready in the second half of the year 2007 and one in which Turkey together with Romania and Italy which will be ready by 2010 because Non-EU European NATO countries which are candidates for accession to the EU can participate in Battle groups.

These Battle Groups will work very closely together with NATO

The EU is attentive to develop its military tools and capabilities, where requirements overlap, in a mutually reinforcing way with NATO initiatives such as the NATO response force. Given the membership overlap between the EU and NATO/Partnership for Peace, the necessary interoperability between forces developed by EU Member States and NATO nations is primarily a responsibility of individual countries.

The command center will be situated either in a national headquarter or the civ-mil cell in Brussels

The cell acting, under the responsibility of the High Representative Javier Solana, will assist in coordinating so called civilian operations and have the responsibility for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU military operation. Elements of the cell may reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU autonomous operation.

This will be an additional step in the EU's effort to enhance its capacity for military intervention planning and achieve a greater militarization of the civilian and police instruments and structures at its disposal in responding to crises.

Berlin Plus - The closest you can get to NATO

The comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, which the Secretary General/High Representative and NATO Secretary General concluded on 17 March 2003, was a landmark in the relations between the two organisations.

EU and NATO concluded an agreement on the security of information.

When a crisis gives rise to an EU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities, the EU and NATO will draw on the so-called "Berlin Plus arrangements". These arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can also be combined: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities.

On the website of the council you can read the following:

"First, NATO guarantees that the EU has access to NATO planning. At the early stages before the EU even knows whether an operation will eventually take place, this may involve a NATO contribution (by SHAPE in Mons) to the work carried out by the EU Military Staff on the definition of options (these are known as "military strategic options"). Subsequently, should the operation take place with use of NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will provide the operational planning required.

Second, the EU may request that NATO makes available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation. In this case, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is the primary candidate for EU Operation Commander. He will remain at SHAPE where he establishes the EU OHQ. The remaining command elements determined by the EU (such as the EU Force Commander and EU Force Headquarters deployed in theatre or the EU Component Commands) may either be provided by NATO or by EU Member States.

Thirdly, the EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities. To this end, NATO has established a first list of its assets and capabilities that, in strong likelihood, NATO would decide to make available to the EU should the EU need them. In addition, NATO has defined a number of principles as well as financial and legal considerations applicable to the release of its assets and capabilities to the EU. On this basis, a specific EU-NATO agreement setting out the conditions for use of NATO assets and capabilities is drawn up for a given operation. Such agreement provides in particular for a possible recall of assets due to unforeseen circumstances, for example due to the emergence of a NATO Article 5 contingency (this means an attack against a NATO member)."

Let's not fight their wars - For NATO or the EU or a Coalition of the Willing. Let's not fight for the interests of the US and the big European Member states in Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo or Lebanon. Let's fight against the policy of this new euro-Atlantic imperialism and neo-colonialism. And I experienced it myself on your beautiful island when I came to visit the military base in Akrotiri and was told to leave because this British military base, which is providing infrastructure for the wars in the Middle East, is not territory of the European Union - it's not Cyprus. Then I understood what neo-colonialism and militarism mean and how they are connected, because they create the extraterritorial status in order to do what they want to prepare their wars. This must come to an end. It won't be easy and it might take time but the most important is that we never never appease ourselves with the status quo, which is nothing more than the state of war.

Thank you!